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Abstract 
We study the impact of deterrence, tax morale, and simplifying information on tax compliance. We ran _ve 
experiments spanning the tax process which varied the communication of the tax administration with all income 
taxpayers in Belgium. A consistent picture emerges across experiments: (i) simplifying communication 
increases compliance, (ii) deterrence messages have an additional positive effect, (iii) invoking tax morale is not 
effective. Even tax morale messages that improve knowledge and appreciation of public services do not raise 
compliance. In fact, heterogeneity analysis with causal forests shows that tax morale treatments backfire for 
most taxpayers. In contrast, simplification has large positive effects on compliance, which diminish over time 
due to follow-up enforcement. A discontinuity in enforcement intensity, combined with the experimental 
variation, allows us to compare simplification with standard enforcement measures. Simplification is far more 
cost-effective, allowing for substantial savings on enforcement costs, and also improves compliance in the next 
tax cycle. 
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1 Introduction
Tax compliance sits at the heart of the healthy functioning of societies. It is therefore of little
surprise that gaining a robust understanding of the drivers of tax compliance is an important
topic in the economics literature. Tax compliance involves both the truthful reporting of
taxable income and the timely payment of tax dues. The growth in third-party reporting of
income has limited the ability to misreport income (see Kleven et al. (2011, 2016); Jensen
(2019)).1 Tax administrations, however, continue to devote considerable resources to the
collection of taxes. In the United States the annual cost of non-compliance with individual
income taxes due to nonfiling, underreporting, and underpayment is estimated to total about
$319 billion (Internal Revenue Service, 2016). Closing the “tax gap” is a key objective for
governments around the world and relies on improving our understanding of the drivers of
tax compliance and the cost effectiveness of further interventions (OECD, 2010; HM Revenue
& Customs, 2018).
The classic work by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) provided a work-horse model for un-
derstanding tax compliance through pecuniary incentives that deter non-compliance. Since
then, a large body of research has stressed the role of non-pecuniary motives more broadly
(e.g., Kirchler (2007); Luttmer and Singhal (2014); Besley et al. (2019)), often referred to as
tax morale. Recent work has also highlighted the importance of information frictions and
private costs underlying tax compliance (e.g., Bhargava and Manoli (2015); Hoopes et al.
(2015); Benzarti (2017)). There is now scattered evidence for these different drivers of tax
compliance to be important across a variety of settings (see Slemrod (2018)), but several
questions remain unanswered. How important are these different drivers relative to each
other in the same context? Do their effects depend on the stage of the tax cycle? On
the treated population? Do they interact or persist over time? Can they be leveraged to
complement standard enforcement measures?
This paper aims to provide a comprehensive comparison of these three key drivers of
tax compliance – deterrence, tax morale and information frictions – and also compares
their effect to standard enforcement measures. We study compliance effects throughout the
tax process – including the timing of tax filing, the reporting of taxable income, and the
payment of taxes – for all individuals subject to personal income taxation in Belgium. We
compare these potential drivers of tax compliance in the same context and put them at equal
footing by varying the content of the tax letters sent by the Belgian tax authority (Federal
Public Service Finance, FPS Finance). In total, we ran five population-wide experiments in
1Recent empirical work investigates the misreporting of foreign income in developing countries (e.g.,
Alstadsæter et al. (2018)) and of taxable income in developing countries (e.g., Pomeranz (2015); Naritomi
(2018)) where paper trails are missing or the enforcement capacity falls short.
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collaboration with the FPS Finance over the course of three fiscal years, 2014-2016. This
comprehensive approach allows us to replicate findings at different stages of the tax process
and across fiscal years, and to estimate longer-term, repetition and interaction effects.
The standard communication from the tax administration to taxpayers consists of the
request to file a tax return and the request to pay taxes. Follow-up correspondence takes place
in the event of taxpayers being either late in filing their tax return or being late in paying
their tax dues. Our main focus is to leverage these different phases of communication in
order to simultaneously test varying treatments related to the simplification of information,
the use of deterrence, or the appeal to tax morale. The simplification treatments entail
shortening the length of the letters, reducing the information overload and highlighting the
action-relevant information to the taxpayer. The deterrence treatments add a message to the
simplified letter that makes the financial penalties explicit and/or highlight the enforcement
actions in case of (further) non-compliance. The tax morale treatments add a message that
highlights the public good value of tax expenditures and/or the social norms attached to
filing and paying taxes on time.
Our experiments provide very precise and consistent results across the tax process and the
respective samples of taxpayers addressed. Simpler communication and deterrence messages
significantly increase compliance, inducing people to file and pay their taxes sooner. The
effects are substantial. Despite tax withholding one out of three tax payers has a positive
outstanding balance on their tax bill, adding up to a total of 3.8 billion euros in 2016
(about 10 percent of personal income taxes). The simplification and deterrence treatment
together increased timely payment after receiving a positive tax bill by 1.4% (resp. .51pp
and .53pp). The compliance effects are particularly large for the reminder letters sent to
the late tax payers and tax filers: the combined effect of simplification and deterrence on
timely compliance is 26% (resp. 10.0pp and 1.2pp) for paying taxes and 17% (resp. 2.6pp
and 2.8pp) for filing taxes. Overall, it is reducing information overload and making action-
relevant information salient that seems particularly effective. Tax payers are also successfully
induced to comply by making potential penalties and their enforcement explicit, and by the
encouragement to pay immediately to avoid these penalties.
We study the full dynamics of the treatment effects on late payers, which diminish over
time as the tax administration takes further enforcement measures (including imposing gar-
nishments and sending bailiffs) to eventually reach close to full compliance. The treatment
effects at the end of the tax cycle are 1.0pp, which is ten times smaller than the effect at the
payment deadline. Still, the cost savings on follow-up enforcement imply a large return to the
letter treatments. We exploit an enforcement discontinuity, combined with our experimental
variation, to disentangle their respective effects. For the sample of late tax payers around
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the enforcement cut-off, we estimate that the simplification treatment would have increased
compliance by 9 percentage points in the absence of standard follow-up enforcement.
In contrast with the simplification and deterrence treatments, our treatments that seek
to improve tax morale obtain no compliance effects and sometimes even reduce compliance.
The ineffectiveness is replicated across all treatments arms, which include messages that
invoke social norms, emphasize the social value of public expenditure or combine the two.
We also experiment with a pie chart pop-up on how taxes are spent for online tax filers,
which does not affect reported taxable income or claimed tax deductions, nor the perceived
importance of honesty as measured in an endline survey. The survey suggests that while
the tax morale treatment does not trigger a shift in compliance, it does increase taxpayers’
knowledge and appreciation of public services.
Our setting allows us to push the frontier on the evaluation of letter treatments and
behavioral interventions more generally in three important ways:
First, while nudges are by definition low-cost interventions, a key challenge is to know how
they compare to the standard policy levers that they complement (Benartzi et al., 2017). To
address this, we use the enforcement discontinuity to compare the causal impact of regular
enforcement interventions to the experimental letter treatments for the exact same people
(i.e., late taxpayers around the enforcement threshold). Projected on the sample of late
taxpayers, a back-of-the envelope calculation tells us that the simplification treatment for
this experiment alone could have increased tax collection by e20.2 million, or alternatively,
amounted to savings on enforcement costs worth e5.4 million. The implementation costs of
the nudge intervention were trivial in comparison (e79,511).
Another important concern is whether the gains from nudges are long-lived (Allcott and
Rogers, 2014; Cronqvist et al., 2018): do one-time interventions have long-term effects? Do
repeated interventions remain as effective? We repeated the experiment on the late tax-
payers in two consecutive years. We find that there are no diminishing marginal returns
to repeating the treatment in that recidivists are equally responsive to a simplified letter
independent of the letter type they received in the previous year. Moreover, we find that the
effects extend to the following fiscal years: late payers are less likely to be late again in the
next year after having received a simplified reminder letter in the first year, but this effect
is offset if they received a tax morale treatment as well. In fact, the tax morale treatment
has a significant, negative impact even two years later.2
Finally, the population-wide nature of our experiments give us sufficient power to study
2These findings extend on Brockmeyer et al. (2019), who find sustained effects from a deterrence message
on firms’ tax compliance in Costa Rica. These findings differ from Guyton et al. (2016), who find no long-term
effects and positive returns from repeating reminders in claiming EITC.
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heterogeneity in treatment effects, which are key to think about the distributional welfare
consequences, but can also be leveraged to target the interventions where they are most ef-
fective. We use machine-learning techniques (Wager and Athey, 2018; Chernozhukov et al.,
2018) to study heterogeneous treatment effects based on observables in the late payers ex-
periment. While the dispersion is substantial, the simplification treatment effects are always
positive. The deterrence treatments are unlikely to backfire, while the tax morale treat-
ments almost never increase compliance. We also find that simplification was most effective
among taxpayers with children, potentially consistent with their reduced attention span.
The treatment effects are also smaller among tax payers with large outstanding tax liability,
while we find no discernible differences by income. Finally, the tax administration predicts
the solvency of all tax payers and we find that the treatments are the least effective among
taxpayers with either very low or very high solvency scores.
Our paper contributes to the long literature studying the drivers of tax compliance and
the growing number of randomized controlled tax trials in particular (see Slemrod (2018)).3
The key advantage of our experimental setting is that we test the main drivers of tax compli-
ance in the same way, in the same setting, and on the same sample, which ensures compara-
bility. Moreover, we intervene through the standard communication by the tax authority to
its tax payers, but do so at different stages of the tax process and for different subsets of the
tax payer population, which gives some external validity to our design. We also test different
variations of similar treatments and study heterogeneous treatment effects, both of which
help with establishing robustness and uncovering underlying mechanisms. The advantages
of our setting are particularly valuable when results in the literature are mixed, as is the
case for interventions appealing to tax morale. For example, Del Carpio (2014) finds positive
and long-lasting impacts from invoking social norms on compliance in property taxation in
Peru. Hallsworth et al. (2017) find that social norms and public services messages in official
reminder letters increased payment rates for overdue tax in the UK. Bott et al. (2017) find
that the inclusion of a moral appeal increases the reporting of foreign income in Norway.
However, several other experiments testing normative appeals have found null or even neg-
ative results (e.g., Blumenthal et al. (2001), John and Blume (2018)). In particular, Cranor
et al. (2018) test both deterrence and social norm treatments on the compliance by late tax
payers in Colorado. They find that invoking social norms has no compliance effects, while
making the penalty explicit has.4 Among the behavioral drivers of tax compliance there is an
3On the role of enforcement and deterrence, see reviews by Andreoni et al. (1998) and Slemrod and
Yitzhaki (2002). An example of an RCT changing audit probabilities is Kleven et al. (2011). An example
of an RCT changing the penalty information is Cranor et al. (2018). On the psychological, cultural, social,
and normative factors underlying tax compliance, see reviews by Torgler (2007), Alm (2012), and Luttmer
and Singhal (2014).
4Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2018) find that shaming tax payers by making their non-compliance public
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increasing focus on the role of simplification. While this paper does not address tax system
complexity by itself and how that affects taxable behavior (e.g., Chetty and Saez (2013),
Abeler and Ja¨ger (2015), Aghion et al. (2017)), it does shed new light on the informational
complexity that is often associated with the process of filing and paying taxes and claiming
benefits (see e.g., Slemrod et al. (2001), Kleven and Kopczuk (2011), Hoopes et al. (2015),
Cox et al. (2018)). Bhargava and Manoli (2015) identify psychological barriers to the take-up
of EITC benefits due to information complexity – with the mere simplification of the mailing
leading to a significant increase in take-up. In a similar spirit, we show that simplifying the
communication of the tax administration has a substantial effect on tax compliance – and
that this effect can outweigh the effects of nudges related to deterrence and tax morale.
The paper proceeds as follows. We describe the context and empirical setting in the
next section. Section 3 discusses the main experimental results by treatment categories,
while Section 4 digs deeper within treatment categories to shed some light on mechanisms.
Section 5 analyzes the regression-discontinuity in enforcement, compares its relative cost-
effectiveness and discusses welfare and heterogeneous treatment effects. Section 6 concludes.
2 Context and Design
This section presents the five experiments we study and describes the experimental samples.
We also provide some background on the tax filing and payment cycle for personal income
taxation in Belgium.
2.1 Tax Process
The context of our study is Belgium, which in 2017 had a tax-to-GDP ratio of 44.6% (higher
than the OECD average of 34.2%). We focus on individual income tax, the largest source
of tax revenues. In the fiscal year 2016, individual income tax raised 27.7% of overall tax
revenues, from 7.1 million taxpayers. Income taxes are collected solely at the federal level.
There is a personal tax-free allowance which is currently at 12,990 EUR and marginal taxes
rise from 25 to 50%.5 Fiscal years run from January 1st to December 31st, and the tax cycle
starts in July of the year after the fiscal year in which the income has been earned. There
are four main steps in the annual personal income tax cycle, as shown in Figure 1a: tax
filing, filing reminders, tax payment and payment reminders. We vary the correspondence
increases compliance. However, they find no effects from providing information on others’ non-compliance.
5In comparison, in the US, the tax-to-GDP ratio is lower (27.1%) and income taxes are more important
as a share of tax revenues (38.6%). Federal marginal tax rates are lower (10 to 37%), but lower levels of
government levy additional taxes.
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between the tax administration and taxpayer at each of these steps.
Tax filing (TF): Taxpayers can file their taxes on paper or online, either by themselves
or with the help of an accountant or a tax official.6 The online portal called “Tax-on-Web”
is increasingly popular and in 2017 it was used by 3.8 million taxpayers, of which 1.7 million
submitted their declarations individually, and the rest filed with the help of an accountant
or a government official (we exclude them from the analysis).
Filing reminders (TFR): Figure 1b depicts what happens when taxpayers miss the filing
deadline. Filers who have not submitted by the deadline are sent a filing reminder letter, and
given 14 days to file. If a taxpayer has still not filed seven days after this second deadline,
the tax administration uses its own estimates to compute their tax liability. In the fiscal
year 2016, about 170,000 taxpayers had not filed by the deadline, which represents about
3.5% of taxpayers who were expected to file.
Tax payment (TP): A majority of taxpayers are taxed at the source if they are employees
or pre-pay their taxes based on estimates of their tax liability if they are self-employed. A
significant share of taxpayers also have taxable income below the exemption threshold and
thus pay no income taxes. As a result, less than a third of taxpayers (1.9 million in the fiscal
year 2016) receives a tax bill with a positive payable balance, which they need to pay within
the next two months. The majority of such cases can be explained by insufficient withholding
at the source in situations that made it difficult to calculate the exact tax liability (e.g. tax
payers who hold several jobs, students who work part-time, etc.). Total taxes due at that
stage are 3.8 billion euros.
Payment reminders (TPR): Figure 1c depicts what happens when taxpayers miss the
payment deadline. Taxpayers who have not paid two months after receipt of the tax bill
are sent a payment reminder. Taxpayers who still do not comply are then exposed to
further enforcement actions, which start after 14 days. In the fiscal year 2016, about 220,000
taxpayers had still not paid 14 days after the deadline, and owed a total of 0.8 billion euros,
which represents 12% of taxpayers who received a positive tax bill, and 21% of taxes they
owed.
6Not all taxpayers need to file. About a third of taxpayers (2.2 million in the fiscal year 2016) receive
pre-filled tax returns with no further action required.
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2.2 Experiments
We report on a total of five experiments: one on tax filing (TF), one on filing reminders
(TFR), one on tax payment (TP) and two on payment reminders (TPR). The experiments
spanned three fiscal years (FY), FY2014 to FY2016. The experiments randomized different
treatments that we categorize in three groups: simplification, deterrence and tax morale.
In four experiments out of five, the treatment involved simplifying the letter to com-
municate what the tax administration expected from taxpayers. Simplification included
shortening the letter while retaining the action-relevant information. To attract the atten-
tion of the reader, important information was highlighted in color and/or placed in boxes.
The exact implementation of the treatment varies across treatments as we discuss below.
In most cases, the letter was also personalized, i.e. it was addressed to the taxpayer using
his/her name. The French versions of the letters are shown in Appendix A.7 to A.12; Flemish
and German versions were sent to Flemish and German speaking taxpayers, respectively.
The experiments also tested the effect of deterrence and tax morale through the addition
of short messages in the simplified letter. The deterrence messages aimed at making the
consequences of non-compliance explicit, by explicitly stating fines and tax increases and/or
by explicitly mentioning follow-up enforcement. We also tested messages that encouraged
immediate action to avoid the fines. The tax morale messages, on the other hand, aimed
at raising compliance by increasing the desire of taxpayers to comply with social norms or
to reciprocate for public goods provision. Appendix Table A.1 lists the deterrence and tax
messages used (translated in English).
TP Experiment: The Tax Payment experiment modified the tax bill sent to taxpayers
with a positive liability: the experiment was carried out between November 2017 and May
2018 with 1,216,317 taxpayers (fiscal year 2016). All treated taxpayers received a simplified
letter, only keeping action-relevant information and improving the overall outline: Appendix
Figure A.7 shows the old letter, and Appendix Figure A.8 the simplified letter. For a subset
of treated individuals, the letter included either deterrence messages or tax morale messages
(see Panel A of Appendix Table A.1). For this experiment, outcomes include the probability
of making a payment following letter receipt (extensive margin response), and the fraction
paid conditional on a payment having been made (intensive margin). As baseline outcome,
we use the probability of payment within 60 days after the letter was sent: 60 days is the
deadline given to taxpayers to pay their outstanding debt.
TPR Experiments: The Payment Reminder experiments were conducted with taxpay-
ers who were late in paying their tax: 229,751 taxpayers in 2015/16 (FY2014) and 188,180
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taxpayers in 2016/17 (FY2015).7 The treatment group received a simplified reminder letter,
in which the outstanding tax liability and the deadline were highlighted and other informa-
tion shortened: Appendix Figure A.9 shows the old letter, and Appendix Figure A.10 the
simplified letter. Again, for different subsets of the treatment group, the letter also included
deterrence and tax morale messages (see Panel B of Appendix Table A.1). The baseline out-
come we consider is now the probability of payment within 14 and 180 days after reminder
receipt: 14 days corresponds to the time at which enforcement actions begin. To validate
results and to test the effect of repeated treatments, the TPR experiment was conducted in
two consecutive years.
TF Experiment: The Tax Filing experiment was conducted in 2017 (FY2016) with 1.5
million online tax filers.8 The tax filers were shown a pop-up pie chart either before (treat-
ment) or after (control group) they filed their taxes. The pie chart presented the breakdown
of government spending by categories (see Appendix Figure A.1).9 The chart was accom-
panied by a sentence highlighting that these public services were funded by taxes.10 We
consider this as a similar treatment to the tax morale message in the other experiments. For
this experiment, outcomes come from two sources: administrative data on tax compliance
and answers to an online survey to which all online filers were invited. Due to confidentiality
concerns, the administration did not provide individual information but only average out-
comes (or taxpayers characteristics) within a gender-age cell. The main compliance outcome
is reported taxable income. Other outcomes are tax liability, self-employed profits and ex-
penses, expenses of salaried workers and general expenses. These are also based on declared
values. Survey data is available for those who agreed to answer the questionnaire, which
gauges taxpayers’ knowledge and agreement with the way tax revenue is spent, and their
evaluation of public services and the tax system more generally. The survey instrument is
described in Appendix A.2.11
7In both trials, German speaking taxpayers, taxpayers who had raised objections to the amount they owe
in unpaid taxes and individuals with a BIS number for whom the government did not have a name were not
included in the randomization and received an old letter. Only debts related to the current fiscal year and
letters that are first means of communication with the taxpayer (no updates on balances owed) are included
in the analysis.
8This excludes taxpayers who used an accountant or tax officer to submit their taxes via the online portal.
Our dataset covers taxpayers who submitted their tax returns before mid-August 2017.
9The tax administration also provided a pie chart of government expenditures by region, which was
available when scrolling down.
10For some randomly selected sub-groups, the administration added at the very bottom of the pop-up
an additional sentence that either added a public goods message, mentioned penalties in general terms,
or appealed to social norms in general terms (see Panel C of Appendix Table A.1). We do not find any
differential effect of this second sentence and pool all treatment groups in the analysis.
11All outcome variables were pre-specified in the Pre-analysis Plan (AEARCTR-0002196).
9
TFR Experiment: The Filing Reminders experiment was conducted with 148,925 taxpay-
ers who were late in filing their tax returns in 2016 (FY2015). The treatment group received
a simplified letter, which emphasized the new filing deadline: Appendix Figure A.11 shows
the old two-page long letter and Appendix Figure A.12 shows the one-page simplified let-
ter. A subset of the treatment group received a letter which included deterrence messages
(see Panel D of Appendix Table A.1).12 For these experiments, the baseline outcome is the
probability of filing within 21 days after letter receipt: 21 days is the time at which the tax
administration begins to calculate the tax liability based on income estimates.
2.3 Randomization Design
The allocation of taxpayers to the different treatment groups was done in two different
ways. For the TPR, the TF and the TFR experiments, it was based on the last two digits
of the national identity number, which are random. For the TP experiment, treatment
allocation was based on the day of the month the taxpayer was born, which is also random
and independent of the last digits of the national identity number. Appendix Table A.2
displays the assignment of the two last digits of the national identity number to the different
treatment groups for the TFR, TPR, and TF experiments. There are three things to note.
First, treatment allocation for the TPR 2014 experiment was done on the basis of the
penultimate digit, while the allocation for the TPR 2015 experiment was done on the basis
of the last digit only (see Appendix Table A.3). This implies that the two allocations
are independent from each other, as in a cross-cutting randomization design. As there is
significant overlap between 2014 and 2015 late payers (see Appendix Table A.4), we can
estimate the effect of the two treatments both separately and jointly, to identify the effect
of repeated treatment.
Second, treatment allocations for the TPR 2014 and TFR 2015 experiments coincide
partially, but not completely. A potential concern could be that treatment status in one
experiment affects outcomes in a following experiment. Fortunately, the two experiments
were done on different target populations, since the late payers of 2014 need not be late filers
in 2015. Indeed, the overlap between the two populations is small: as Appendix Table A.4
shows, only 6% of late payers for the fiscal year 2014 were also late filers for the fiscal year
2015. As a robustness check, we estimate the results of the TFR 2015 experiment controlling
for the TPR 2014 treatment assignment and show that our results do not change.
Third, treatment allocation for the TF 2016 experiment again split the tax sample in two
12In the previous year (FY2014), the administration carried out a separate experiment on filing reminders,
in which it included tax morale messages without simplifying the letter first. We managed to collect data
from this experiment and found no effect of the treatment. See Appendix A.1 for more details.
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based on the two last digits of the national identity number, which made it partly, but not
completely coincide with treatment allocations for the TFR and the TPR 2014 experiments.
Unfortunately, to protect privacy the tax administration did not share individual identifiers
for the TF 2016 experiment, so we cannot measure the exact overlap with the sample of
the other two experiments, or control for assignment to previous treatments. However, since
the sample of the TF experiment is much larger (1.5 million, against 150,000 for TFR and
230,000 for TPR 2014), the overlap is likely to be small.
2.4 Population comparison
By focusing on different stages of the tax process, the five experiments test the effect of all
treatment categories on different parts of the taxpayer population. Table 1 shows descrip-
tive statistics on socio-demographic characteristics of the different experimental samples, as
compared to the universe of Belgian taxpayers.
The Belgian personal income taxpayer is on average 49 years old, in a couple in 35% of
the cases and has 0.4 children (column 1). By convention, in the case of households composed
of individuals of both genders, only the gender of the woman is recorded, so that there are
many more female than males (70%). 33% of the taxpayer population lives in Wallonia and
42% speak French. On average, they owe e570, but only 28% have a positive tax liability.
Taxpayers in the TP experiment have a tax liability which is by definition positive, with an
average of e2676. As column 2 shows, they are older, more likely to be in a couple and less
likely to have children. In contrast, taxpayers in the TF experiment (column 4) are the online
filers: they are younger, and have more children. Taxpayers in the reminder experiments
(TPR and TFR in columns 3 and 5) differ from the overall population in similar ways: they
are more likely to be male, less likely to be in a couple, younger, more likely to speak French
and to live in Wallonia. In addition, the taxpayers who are late in paying (column 3) have
lower tax liability than the average taxpayer with positive liability (e1890).
3 Experimental Results
3.1 Baseline Results
To estimate the effect of complexity, deterrence and tax morale throughout the four experi-
ments, we exploit the randomization and simply regress compliance outcomes on treatment
dummies and taxpayer controls. The estimating equation writes:
Y i = α + βSSi + ΣjβjT
j
i + γXi + εi,
11
where Yi is the relevant outcome for taxpayer i, Si is a dummy variable equal to one for
taxpayers who receive a simplified letter, T ji are dummy variables equal to one for the
different types of messages, and Xi denotes a vector of taxpayer controls.
The outcome variable Yi we use for our baseline specification in the tax payment ex-
periment is whether the tax liability (in full or in part) is paid before the deadline, which
is 60 days after the letter receipt. For the reminder experiments, the outcome variable is
whether taxes are filed or paid before the start of follow-up interventions (respectively after
21 and 14 days for the filing and payment experiments). We consider compliance at different
horizons and at the extensive vs. intensive margin below. For the tax filing experiment, the
compliance variable is different in nature, as we look at reported taxable income. Controls
Xi include dummies for age, region, mother tongue, number of children as well as dummies
for time at which the letter was sent for experiments in which letters were sent out in waves.
There are some differences in the remaining controls across experiments; the full list can be
found in Table 113.
The coefficients of interest are βS, which identifies the effect of simplification, and βj,
which identifies the additional effect of deterrence or tax morale. As described in the previous
section, there was no tax morale treatment in the filing reminder experiment.
Figure 2 presents our baseline estimates for the simplification, deterrence and tax morale
treatment. The tax payment and tax filing experiments are in the top and bottom panels
respectively. The experiments on the baseline sample of tax payers/filers are on the left,
while reminder experiments for the late payers/filers are on the right. The figure conveys
a very clear and strong pattern across the four experiments. In the three experiments
in which communication with the taxpayer was simplified (TP, TPR and TFR), it had a
positive effect on tax compliance. In the same three experiments, the deterrence messages
had an additional positive, significant effect. Finally, in the three experiments in which the
administration tried to increase tax morale (TP, TPR and TF), it had either no effect or
even reduced compliance.
The regression estimates are also presented in Table 2, which has the same structure as
Figure 2. The top panel (Panel A) presents the results of the tax payment experiments.
Column 1 shows that as compared to the control group, in which 72.8% of taxpayers paid
their taxes on time, simplifying the tax bill had a positive effect on the probability of paying
on time, increasing it by 0.51pp (se .15pp). Adding a deterrence message increased the prob-
13In the payment reminders experiments we include also dummies for amount owed, income and solvency
score quintiles, in the tax payment experiment dummies for amount owed quintiles and in the tax filing
experiment dummies for marital status categories. The survey data is not linkeable to the admin data for
confidentiality reasons, but includes information on the last two digits of the tax ID (used for randomization),
gender and age.
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ability of paying on time further, by 0.53pp (se .11pp). These effects are relatively small, but
significant. The tax morale messages, however, had no additional effect on tax compliance.
The effect of −.12pp (se .09pp) is sufficiently precisely estimated to rule out effects of a
magnitude comparable to the simplification and deterrence treatment. Column 2 presents
the results of the payment reminders experiment. The results are qualitatively similar and
the effects of simplification and deterrence are again substantial. That is, simplifying the
reminder letters increased the probability of paying by 10pp (23% of the control mean), and
deterrence messages had an additional positive effect of 1.2pp (3% of the control mean).
Tax morale messages, however, had an opposite effect, slightly reducing tax compliance
(−0.7pp). The bottom panel (Panel B) presents the results of the tax filing experiments,
which are again very similar qualitatively. The tax morale treatment in the tax filing exper-
iment has no effect on declared taxable income (an effect of .0011 on log income), with the
null effect again being precisely estimated (se .0013). The estimates in Column 2 of Panel B
show that simplification and deterrence had a large positive effect on tax compliance among
late filers. Those who received a simplified letter were 2.6pp more likely to file on time. This
probability increased by an additional 2.8pp for those who received a simplified letter with
a deterrence message, making them 17% more likely to file on time compared to the control
group.14
3.2 Dynamic Effects
We have reported treatment effects at one point in time, respectively at the deadline (TP) and
before the start of enforcement actions (TPR, TFR). Using the payment and filing history,
we can estimate treatment effects at any time – measured in days – after treatment. Let Yi,t
be the tax compliance outcome of individual i at time t. As before, Si denotes a dummy
variable equal to one for taxpayers who received a simplified letter, and T ji are treatment
dummies for deterrence and tax morale messages. We estimate the following equation:
Y i,t = αt + βS,tSi + Σjβj,tT
j
i + γXi + i.
For the tax payment experiment, t ranges from the receipt of the tax bill to 60 days after,
corresponding to the deadline. For the payment reminder experiment, t ranges from the
receipt of the letter to 180 days after. Note that the deadline was two days after, and
that enforcement follow-up does not start until fourteen days after. For the filing reminder
14Appendix Table A.13 presents the results of the filing reminder experiment controlling for the treatment
assignment in the payment reminder experiment. Due to the partial overlap between the two experiments,
the estimates are less precise, but the treatment effects are very similar.
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experiment, t ranges from the receipt of the letter to 60 days after, when for the majority of
non-compliers automatic filing by the administration had finished. The deadline for the late
filers is at 14 days.
Appendix Figure A.2 displays the dynamics of tax compliance in the control group - the
estimated αt - for the three experiments. In the TP experiment, the proportion of taxpayers
who paid in the control group increased slowly after receipt of the tax bill, and then sharply
just before the deadline, so that 72% of taxpayers met the deadline. In the TPR experiment,
only a minority of late payers (17%) met the renewed deadline, and less than half of them
had paid before the beginning of enforcement actions. The pattern is similar in the TFR
experiment: only 25% of late filers in the control group had filed by the renewed deadline
and only 34% had filed before enforcement actions began.
Figure 3 presents the dynamics of the simplification treatment, βS,t. Taxpayers who
received a simplified tax bill were slightly more likely to pay in the first weeks after tax bill
receipt, but the difference with the control group really widened in the last week before the
deadline. This suggests that simplification made both the need to pay and the actual deadline
more salient to taxpayers. For the late payers, the simplified reminders had a strong and
immediate effect on payment probability, which peaked around the time when enforcement
actions started. As enforcement actions began, the control group caught up with treatment,
so that the treatment effects decreased steeply, from above 10pp to below 1pp after six
months, although they were still statistically significant at the end of the period. In Section
5, we disentangle the compliance effect of the simplification treatment and the follow-up
interventions. In the filing reminder experiment, the simplified reminders also had a strong
and rapid effect on filing probability, which again peaked at the time at which enforcement
actions started. Then, as income was automatically filed, the difference in manual filing
remained constant between treatment and control. For completeness, we report the dynamics
of the effects of deterrence and tax morale messages, βj,t, in Appendix Figure A.3. Across the
three experiments, the additional positive effect of deterrence messages, which emphasized
the penalties associated with missing the deadline, were felt gradually, and peaked at the
deadline. In the Payment Reminder experiment, the negative effect of tax morale messages
lingered for about a month, even after enforcement actions begun.
3.3 Long-term Impact and Repeated Treatment
We now turn to the question of whether the impact of the nudge intervention was short-
lived. We first investigate whether one-time interventions can have long-term effects. We
use the randomization in the FY2014 payment reminder experiment to estimate the effect
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of reminder letters on timely payment in the next fiscal year. The results are shown in
column 1 of Panel A of Table 3. We find a positive and significant effect of simplification
on tax compliance in the next financial year. The probability of paying taxes on time in
FY2015 increases by 1.1pp (se 0.28pp). Note that this long-term effect of simplification of the
reminder letter is even slightly larger than short-run effect of the simplification of the tax bill
itself. Of course, the reminder letters were sent to a subsample of taxpayers only. Moreover,
as discussed below, the simplification of the reminder letter was more substantial than the
simplification of the tax bill itself. In contrast with the simplification effects, deterrence
messages have no additional positive impact in the following financial year, while tax morale
messages have, if anything, a negative effect, almost entirely offsetting the long-term impact
of simplification. Moreover, while simplification effects seem to get smaller over time, the
tax morale treatment is associated with significantly lower compliance, even two years after
letter receipt (column 2 Panel A of Table 3). Overall, these estimates suggest that small
nudges can have long term effects.
We also test whether repeated interventions remain effective. We again study this for
the payment reminder experiment, which was carried out for two consecutive years. That
is, the experiment was run in FY2015 with the same treatments as in the main FY2014
experiment. Moreover, the treatment allocation followed two independent random numbers
in the respective years. The repeated treatment allows us to check that our main results are
replicated. The results of the FY2015 Payment Reminder experiment are shown in Panel B
of Table 3. In FY2015 as in FY2014, simplifying tax reminders had a large positive effect
on the probability of paying before enforcement starts (+25%), and deterrence messages
had an additional positive effect (+3.8%), while tax morale messages had a negative effect
(-2.7%). Interestingly, mixing deterrence and tax morale messages had a smaller impact
than deterrence messages alone with a significant difference at 14 days.15
The cross-randomization of the two experiments further allows us to test whether simpli-
fied letters had a larger or smaller effect for taxpayers who received them twice, i.e. whether
repetition induced a reinforcement or a fatigue effect. Only 28% of FY2014 late payers
were late again in FY2015, so we lack power if we estimate FY2015 treatment effects on all
FY2014 late payers. Instead, we use only taxpayers who were late twice, which is a selected
sample, given the long-term effect of the FY2014 treatment. The selection effect can work
against us in finding a positive treatment effect in FY2015, since taxpayers who are still late
15Note also that other nudges do not work in combination with non-simplified letter. In the case of Filing
Reminders, an experiment was run in 2014, but unlike the main 2015 experiment, only tax morale messages
were used, and without simplifying the letter. As Appendix Table A.8 shows, these messages had a null or
negative effect on the probability of filing before enforcement actions started. These results confirm that tax
morale messages do not improve tax compliance.
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in FY2015 despite being treated in FY2014 likely have a lower propensity to pay. On the
other hand, given that they are late again, the FY2014 treatment effect may have been par-
ticularly short-lived for these recidivists, making repetition of the treatment more effective.
With this caveat in mind, we estimate the following equation:
Y 2015i = α + β
2014S2014i + β
2015S2015i + δS
2014
i × S2015i + γXi + εi
where Y 2015i denote compliance in FY2015, and S
2014
i and S
2015
i denote treatment assignment
in FY2014 and FY2015 respectively. The results are presented in Panel C of Table 3. Among
the selected sample of taxpayers who were late twice, simplification had a positive effect on
payment in FY2015 (9.7pp), and was no less (and no more) effective for taxpayers who had
already received a simplified letter in FY2014. The interaction effect δ is zero and relatively
precisely estimated (se 1.2pp). We interpret our results as providing suggestive evidence
against any fatigue effect, at least for recidivist tax payers.16
4 Robustness and Mechanisms
Our results are remarkably consistent across the four experiments, which were implemented
at different stages of the tax process, and on different populations: simplification and deter-
rence have positive effects on tax compliance, while tax morale messages do not. This section
discusses some further results by treatment category, aiming to convey the robustness of the
results and hinting at some potential mechanisms. We focus on treatment variations within
each category and their impact on tax compliance and other outcome variables.
Simplification Our experiments show that simplifying the tax correspondence can
have a substantial impact on compliance. With a single experimental treatment, it is often
challenging to establish the external validity of the results and to know which components of
the treatment worked. The richness of our setting allows us to assess the robustness of the
effect of the simplification treatment across experiments and to analyze the effect of slight
variations in the treatment within an experiment.
A first step is to compare the magnitude of the effects of simplification across experiments.
For this, it is important to keep in mind that while the simplified letters look very similar,
the quality of the old letters was different. In particular, in the letter sending the tax bill,
the required actions were already presented together and highlighted in the old letter, but
made even more salient in the new letter (Appendix Figures A.7 and A.8). For the old
16Results for the deterrence and tax morale messages confirm this conclusion (see Table A.5).
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payment reminder letter, the action-relevant information was hidden and spread out over
a long, technical letter, also containing information that was only relevant for internal use
(Appendix Figure A.9). The quality of the old filing reminder letter was arguably in between
(Appendix Figure A.11). In the payment reminder experiment, the simplified presentation
increased tax compliance by as much as 23% before the start of follow-up enforcement. This
effect is larger than in the filing reminder experiment and an order of magnitude larger than
in the payment experiment (see Table 2). Hence, simplification was effective everywhere,
but had a larger impact in contexts where communication used to be more complex.
Next, for the tax payment experiments (TP and TPR), we can estimate the effects on both
the extensive and intensive margins of tax payment. Panel A of Appendix Table A.7 shows
the treatment effects on the fraction of the tax liability paid conditional on paying. We find
positive effects of simplification at the intensive margin, but of much smaller magnitude than
the extensive margin effects (and only significant in TP and TPR2015). Together with the
dynamic patterns discussed before, with larger effects at the deadline and potentially right
after receipt of the letter, the results suggest that the simplified communication is effective
in making the deadline more salient and reduces chances to forget to pay or file before the
deadline, but may also help overcome erroneous non-compliance and trigger more immediate
action. Finally, the tax payment experiments (TP and TPR) also included treatments which
varied more subtle features of the letter design, for example dropping the use of names in
addressing the taxpayer and changing the order of the male and female partner of a couple.
These treatments did not deliver any significantly different effect (see Table A.6).
Deterrence While prior work - both theoretical and empirical - has highlighted the
importance of deterrence to tackle tax evasion, our experiments show that making penalties
explicit in tax correspondence can increase tax compliance too. The effect is of similar mag-
nitude across the different experiments, increasing compliance by around 1 − 2 percentage
points. The baseline deterrence treatment in the tax payment and payment reminder exper-
iments states the average penalty (of e209) explicitly. While personalizing stated penalty
amounts is outside the scope of this study, the treatment effect is somewhat larger in the
filing reminder treatment, in which instead of the average penalty, the range of possible
penalties (from e5 to e1,250) and tax rate increases (from 10 to 200 percent) is stated. We
also find that emphasizing the seizing of income/assets to collect penalties in addition to the
stated penalty further increases compliance (from .1pp to 2.5pp in TPR, FY2015 - see Ap-
pendix Table A.6).17 We also tested a more implicit variation of this enforcement message,
17The difference in treatment effects between the explicit penalty and the explicit penalty+enforcement
treatment is significant with a p-value of 0.001.
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which is to emphasize instead that not paying taxes will be seen as an active choice, building
on Hallsworth et al. (2015). This treatment had no significant effect, potentially in line with
the ineffectiveness of the tax morale treatments in our context. In contrast, by emphasiz-
ing the returns to immediate action in terms of avoiding any potential penalty significantly
increased compliance. In the payment reminder experiment, making the penalty explicit in
combination with the message “By paying now, you may still avoid these costs.” increased
compliance from 1pp to 1.9pp (see TPR, FY2015 in Appendix Table A.6).18 Also in the
tax payment experiment, we have ran a treatment in which we explicitly highlighted the
returns to immediate action, which increased the treatment effect from the simplified letter
from .46 to 0.71 percentage points (see TP in Appendix Table A.6). This complements the
earlier finding from the simplification treatment that besides making the relevant informa-
tion salient, there is also a role for encouraging immediate action. We do not find an effect
of deterrence at the intensive margin, when looking at the paid tax liability conditional on
paying (Appendix Table A.7).
Tax Morale Our finding that tax morale messages are ineffective in raising tax com-
pliance contrasts with some earlier studies on tax payment (e.g., Hallsworth et al. (2017) in
the UK) and on tax filing (e.g., Bott et al. (2017) on foreign income reporting in Norway).
However, a series of studies have found no effects when introducing normative appeals (e.g.,
Blumenthal et al. (2001), John and Blume (2018)). If anything, in our setting, invoking tax
morale seems counterproductive: the negative effect is insignificant in the tax payment and
tax filing experiment, but significant at the 5% and 1% level in the 2014 and 2015 payment
reminder experiments, respectively. We both widen and strengthen the evidence by finding
no or negative results at the payment and the filing stage, for the full population of tax
payers / filers and on the subset of late filers / payers. Since we work on the universe of
Belgium tax payers, the estimates are sufficiently precise to reject at usual significance levels
that tax morale messages have effects of a magnitude comparable to the simplification and
deterrence treatments. The tax morale message is also consistent across different treatment
variations used in prior literature, either emphasizing the social value of the tax expendi-
tures, or invoking the social norm of tax compliance by other Belgian taxpayers, framed
in different ways, stated by themselves or interacted (see Appendix Table A.8). For the
online tax filing experiment, the treatment is somewhat different (i.e., the pop-up of a pie
chart of tax expenditures) and so is the compliance measure (i.e., reported taxable income).
However, the conclusions are the same. Panel B of Appendix Table A.7 shows the impact
18The difference in treatment effects between the explicit penalty and the explicit penalty+immediacy
treatment is significant with a p-value of 0.047.
18
of the pie chart treatment on five other tax compliance outcomes, including self-employed
profits and deductible expenses. The average treatment effect on tax compliance is precisely
estimated, but always insignificant.
Survey Results To shed some light on the reasons why tax morale messages are in-
effective, we can exploit the large-scale survey implemented in combination with the online
tax filing experiment. Taxpayers who filed their taxes online for the fiscal year 2016 were
invited to participate to the survey immediately after they filed. As part of the tax filing
experiment, a random subset of them had seen the pie-chart describing government expen-
ditures before they filed. The other tax filers had not yet seen the pie-chart, which was only
shown to them after they had completed the survey (or declined to participate). A total of
79,334 tax filers completed the voluntary survey: take-up rates were similar in the treatment
and control groups (resp. 5.15% and 5.14%).19 As an internal validity check, we first confirm
that tax filers who were shown the pie chart were significantly more likely to state that they
knew how taxes are spent. Respondents were also asked to state the actual expenditure
share for each category. Using their responses we construct an index that is based on the
standardized sum of absolute deviations between the stated and the actual share over all
spending categories, and we find that treated tax filers scored significantly higher in that
index (see columns 1 and 2 of Panel B of Table 4). At the very least, these results con-
firm that the pie chart was noticed and provided some new information. Second, we find
that showing the pie chart significantly increased tax filers’ agreement with how taxes were
spent in general. Respondents were asked for their preferred ranking of categories of public
spending in terms of budgetary priorities. Using survey responses and actual rankings, we
construct a preference index and find that treated tax filers’ stated preferences were closer
to the actual expenditures (see columns 3 and 4). We also find that treated tax filers stated
that they value the public services financed with tax revenues more. In the end, however,
treated tax filers were not more likely to be satisfied with the general tax system and not
more likely to agree with the statement that taxes should be reported honestly (see Panel
A of Table 4). These results suggest that while the pie chart treatment was effective in
improving taxpayers’ knowledge and their appreciation of how their taxes were spent, this
may have been insufficient to improve their tax morale.
19The only individual level characteristics available in the data sets are gender and age. We compare
the treatment and control group within the pool of respondents and find a (small) difference in gender:
respondents in the treatment group were 0.8% more likely to be male.
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5 Enforcement, Welfare and Heterogeneity
This section compares the effectiveness of nudges in raising tax compliance among late tax
payers with that of enforcement actions by the tax administration. We exploit a regression
discontinuity in enforcement intensity, which, combined with the experimental design, pro-
vides a unique opportunity to estimate the causal impact of nudge-type interventions and
of standard policy levers for the same population and in the same setting. We then discuss
three different ways to assess the relative cost-effectiveness of nudges and standard enforce-
ment actions. Finally, we explore heterogeneous treatment effects, which are indicative of
the distributional effects of nudges and helpful to improve their targeting.
5.1 Nudges vs. Enforcement
The tax administration relies on various enforcement actions to make late payers comply.
The first follow-up intervention for late tax filers and taxpayers is naturally the reminder
letter, which we experimentally manipulated. Individuals who do not comply after receiving
the reminder are subject to further enforcement actions. Local tax administrators have some
discretion in the choice of enforcement mechanisms. Commonly used tools for payment non-
compliers include sending registered letters (which require confirmation of receipt), imposing
garnishments and the use of bailiffs. The dynamic pattern of the treatment effects (Figure 3)
showed that the letter treatments accelerated tax payments, but that their final effect on tax
compliance was more modest. The timing of the decline in treatment effects corresponds to
the start of the enforcement actions undertaken by the administration, which suggests that
these actions are responsible for the control group catching up with treatment.
To provide causal evidence on the effect of enforcement actions, we implement a regression
discontinuity design which exploits exogenous variation in enforcement intensity at a specific
threshold for the outstanding tax liability. We then combine the regression discontinuity
with the simplification treatment to understand both how much the simplification treatment
reduced the need for follow-up enforcement and how much the follow-up enforcement reduced
the impact of the simplification treatment.
As Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows, there is a clear jump in the probability of enforcement
actions above the tax liability threshold (normalized to 0 for confidentiality reasons), both
in the treatment and control group.20 There is no evidence of bunching below the thresh-
old, which confirms that it is not known to the public (see Figure A.4). Moreover, before
enforcement started, the probability of paying is smooth at the cut-off in both groups. This
20We drop taxpayers with a liability exactly at the cut-off. The threshold value is a round number and
the distribution of liabilities shows bunching at all round numbers in the vicinity of the threshold.
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probability of paying, however, is much higher in the treatment than in the control group,
which explains why both to the left and to the right of the cut-off, the treatment group is less
likely to be subject to enforcement interventions. Importantly, the absence of discontinuities
in the density and the pre-enforcement outcomes, both in the treatment and control group,
seems to validate the use of a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of
enforcement actions.
The impact of enforcement on compliance is illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 4. The
fraction of taxpayers who have paid after 180 days is higher to the right than to the left
of the threshold. Interestingly, compliance levels are similar in the treatment and control
group to the right of the cut-off where enforcement intensity is high, while to the left where
intensity is lower the treatment group is substantially more compliant.
To estimate the causal effects of the simplification treatments and the enforcement ac-
tions, we implement the standard regression discontinuity method in the control group, and
add treatment dummies. Formally, let Yi denote the tax compliance outcome of individual
i, zi their tax liability, c the tax liability cutoff. As before, Si a dummy variable equal to
one for the randomly assigned group who received the simplified letter and Xi is a vector of
individual characteristics (see Table 1). The estimating equation is:
Yi = α + βSSi + βE1{zi − c > 0}+ βS,ESi × 1{zi − c > 0}
+ δC,l(zi − c) + δC,r1{zi − c > 0} × (zi − c) + δS,lSi × (zi − c)
+ δS,rSi × 1{zi − c > 0} × (zi − c) + γXi + εi
Due to the random assignment, βS is the effect of simplification at the cutoff from the left,
where enforcement is weaker. Due to the regression-discontinuity, βE identifies the effect
of additional enforcement actions on tax compliance in the control group. Combining the
two sources of variation, βS,E identifies the difference in treatment effects due to higher
enforcement at the threshold. As in a typical regression discontinuity setting, δC,l and
δC,r capture the relation between the forcing variable (tax liability) and the outcome (tax
compliance) to the left and the right of the discontinuity, while δS,l and δS,r allow this
relation to be different for the treatment group. An alternative interpretation is that the
latter interaction terms allow for heterogeneity in treatment effects depending on the tax
liability, both to the left and to the right of the cutoff.
Table 5 presents the corresponding regression results, using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman
bandwidth computed for the control group in our experiment. We first consider the RDD
estimates for the control group in our experiment. Column 1 confirms that the probability
of enforcement increased by more than 50%, from 20 to 33%, at the threshold. Before
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enforcement actions begun, the payment probability, however, was smooth at the threshold
(Column 2). In contrast, 180 days after reminder receipt, the payment probability increased
by 6pp at the threshold, reaching a probability of 88% for taxpayers in the control group
to the right of the threshold (Column 3). Second, we consider the effects of simplification,
not just on payment, but also on follow-up enforcement. As Column 1 shows, simplification
decreased the probability of any enforcement action by almost half, from 20% in the control
to 12%. This is due to the fact that simplified reminders made late payers 15pp more likely to
pay before enforcement actions begun: from 49 to 64% (Column 2). Note that these effects
are larger than those we report for the whole late payer sample (see Table 2). After 180 days,
once payment rates in the control group have increased to 81%, the treatment effects were
smaller, but still significant: a 4pp increase (Column 3). Finally, we estimate the difference
in treatment effects to the left and to the right of the threshold. While the difference βS,E
is not significant, the estimate is negative and large enough to mostly offset the positive
treatment effect on the probability of paying at 180 days (Column 3).21 This confirms the
graphical evidence that with high intensity enforcement the effects of simplification in the
long run are virtually zero.
While the compliance benefits of nudges seem to disappear because of follow-up interven-
tions on non-compliant taxpayers, they do bring important benefits by saving on enforcement
costs as we discuss further below. Interestingly, we can also use our results to estimate the
counterfactual effect of simplification after 180 days if the follow-up enforcement interven-
tion had not taken place. Of course, in practice, the reminder letters effectiveness depends
on tax payers’ expectation of the follow-up enforcement by the administration. Still, to
calculate the effect of simplification net of the crowd-out by the follow-up interventions, we
impute the level of compliance based on the difference in compliance between high and low
intensity enforcement groups scaled up by the difference in enforcement probability between
them. Formally, let Y denote the payment probability, F the enforcement probability, z tax
liability, c the cutoff and S letter simplification. Let the superscript F and Y denote the es-
timated coefficients when the dependent variable is F and Y , respectively. We approximate
21Note that these effects are driven by registered letters and garnishments (Appendix Table A.11).
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the average treatment effect in absence of enforcement, ATE0, by:
ATE0 ≈
[
E(Y |S=1,z<c)− E(F |S=1,z<c)E(Y |S=1,z>c)− E(Y |S=1,z<c)
E(F |S=1,z>c)− E(F |S=1,z<c)
]
−
[
E(Y |S=0,z<c)− E(F |S=0,z<c)E(Y |S=0,z>c)− E(Y |S=0,z<c)
E(F |S=0,z>c)− E(F |S=0,z<c)
]
=
(α̂Y + β̂YS )− (α̂F + β̂FS )
(
β̂YE + β̂
Y
S,E
)
(
β̂FE + β̂
F
S,E
)
− [α̂Y − α̂F β̂YE
β̂FE
]
= 0.09
This calculation also relies on a homogeneity assumption: we need that the effect of enforce-
ment on the payment probability is the same for taxpayers who pay only when enforcement
intensity increases from below to above the threshold and for taxpayers who pay even with
low intensity enforcement. The counterfactual analysis suggests that in absence of the follow-
up enforcement actions, the effect of simplification on the payment probability of late payers
would have been 9pp after 180 days, which is approximately two-thirds of the effect estimated
before enforcement actions begun (15pp).
5.2 Cost-Effectiveness and Welfare
We evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the simplification treatment in three different ways.
First, we compare the benefits of the treatment in terms of additional revenue and savings
on enforcement actions to the costs of simplifying the tax correspondence. Second, we
compare the cost of raising one euro of extra revenue through reminder simplification and
through enforcement actions. Finally, we calculate the total cost of enforcement actions that
would be needed to raise the same extra revenue as the simplification treatment, using the
counterfactual effect of simplification in the absence of follow-up enforcement.
The first method is based on experimental results only. To compute extra revenues,
we estimate the effect of simplified letters on the probability of paying taxes as late as
possible in the tax cycle, which is 180 days after the payment deadline, and assume that
after this date the treatment effect will remain constant.22 As Appendix Table A.9 shows, the
estimated treatment effect on the probability of payment at 180 days is about 1pp, which we
multiply by the average amount paid, conditional on a payment, at that date (e1,615) and
the number of tax payers in the treatment group (204,223) to obtain total extra revenues
equal to e3.14 million. To compute savings on the cost of enforcement, we estimate the
effect of simplified letters on the probability of the three most common forms of enforcement
22After 180 days, tax filing for the next fiscal year begins: the administrative data that we use does not
allow us to track outstanding debts separately from new tax liabilities.
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actions – registered letters, garnishment and bailiffs. Multiplied by the cost of the respective
enforcement measures, we obtain a total cost saving of e0.70 million.23 Adding the extra
revenues and costs savings on enforcement, the total benefit of the intervention equals e3.84
million. In comparison, the costs of simplification were negligible: the administration paid
e69,300 for the design of the new letter, including ICT staff, data analysts, legal experts,
communication staff and management, and the printing of the new (colored) letter costs an
extra e0.05 per letter. The total cost of simplifying the reminder letters amounts to e79, 511
and is about 50 times smaller than its benefits. Simplifying the reminder letters was thus a
high return investment for the tax administration.
The second method builds on the regression discontinuity results from the previous sec-
tion. Since we are able to estimate the compliance effects of the simplification treatment
and the enforcement interventions separately, we can ask what the most cost-effective way
is to raise one euro of extra revenue. It is well known in optimal tax theory that from an
efficiency perspective the excess burden of different taxes should be equalized at the mar-
gin. Extending this insight, Keen and Slemrod (2017) have shown that in absence of equity
considerations the excess burden of each tax should be equalized with the marginal cost of
interventions to enforce payment of the tax. For the enforcement interventions, we first use
regression discontinuity estimates for the increase in the probability that registered letters
(10.2pp) and garnishment (5.9pp) are sent at the threshold (see Appendix Table A.11) and
their cost (e5.7 and e17.1 respectively) to compute the cost of the increase in enforcement
intensity at the threshold, which is e1.6.24 We then use regression discontinuity estimates
of the effect of enforcement intensity on the probability of payment at 180 days (from Ta-
ble 5) multiplied by average payments made at the threshold to estimate additional revenues
raised. The ratio of the two, i.e., the cost of raising one more euro of tax revenues through
enforcement is equal to e0.27. This estimate is arguably in the range of standard estimates
of the marginal excess burden of personal income taxes, suggesting that the enforcement
intensity may well be desirable (Keen and Slemrod, 2017). In comparison, the resource cost
of using nudge interventions is much smaller. As explained above, the cost of simplification
was e79, 511, or e0.39 per letter sent. We multiply our counterfactual estimate of the ef-
fect of simplification on the probability of payment in the absence of follow-up enforcement
23As Appendix Table A.10 shows, the estimated treatment effects on follow-up enforcement are −7.4pp for
registered letters, −2.8pp for garnishment actions and −1.2pp for bailiffs. Multiplying these figures by the
cost of each action and the number of treated taxpayers, we obtain costs savings of e5.7 ∗ 0.074 ∗ 204, 223 =
86, 141 for registered letters, e17.1 ∗ 0.028 ∗ 204, 223 = 97, 084 for garnishment and e213 ∗ 0.012 ∗ 204, 233 =
513, 294 for bailiffs.
24As Appendix Table A.11 shows, there is no significant increase in the use of bailiff at the threshold. As
an enforcement tool, the use of bailiffs is applied to debts of relatively large amounts, while registered letters
and garnishments are more often employed.
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by the average tax payment, and obtain e8.74 extra revenue per letter. Hence the cost of
raising one euro with simplified reminders is e0.05, which is six times smaller than with
enforcement actions.25 This second method confirms that simplifying reminders is far more
cost-effective than intensifying enforcement.
The third method extrapolates the regression discontinuity results to the whole sample,
using a back-of-the envelope calculation. At the enforcement threshold, the treatment effect
was 15pp after 14 days and the counterfactual effect absent follow-up enforcement at 180
days was 9pp (Table 5). Hence for the whole sample the estimated treatment effect of 10.3pp
after 14 days suggests that the counterfactual effect, in the absence of follow-up enforcement,
would have been 10.3 ∗ 9/15 = 6pp at 180 days. Multiplying this figure by taxes paid by the
treatment group gives e20.2million of extra revenue. To obtain these extra revenues with
traditional enforcement methods at the cost of 27 cents per euro raised, the government
would have had to spend e5.4 million. This is again subtantially higher than the cost of the
simplification intervention.
Regardless of the method we use for the cost-benefit analysis, simplifying letters seems
highly cost effective, in itself and when compared to the alternative of using standard enforce-
ment actions. The above calculations, however, ignore other welfare-relevant considerations
that may be important when assessing the use of nudges. First of all, the letter treatments -
when successful - changed the net transfers between taxpayers and the government, not only
by affecting the taxes paid, but also avoiding the late penalties and interests on outstanding
tax liability. Second, the nudges can affect individuals’ welfare above and beyond their after-
tax income. The simplified correspondence reduces compliance costs, but may also reduce
the disutility of paying taxes. While the same may be true for highlighting the public value
of taxes paid, the opposite effect seems as plausible when using deterrence or invoking social
norms.26 Finally, the nudges may have heterogeneous effects and differentially affect different
groups, which may enter the welfare considerations. We turn to these heterogeneous effects
next.
5.3 Heterogeneous Effects
Understanding heterogeneity in treatment effects is important for assessing the potential dis-
tributional welfare consequences of an intervention, which will also depend on the incidence
25We consider this a conservative estimate as the cost of nudging is largely driven by the fixed costs of
experimental design. If these are ignored the per letter cost goes down to 0.05 making it eight times cheaper
and thus lowering significantly the cost to benefit ratio of the nudging intervention.
26For example, Di Tella et al. (2015) show that complexity can lead people to be “conveniently upset” and
use it as an excuse not to comply.
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of frictions that the intervention tries to overcome.27 Understanding the heterogeneity can
also be instrumental for improving the targeting of interventions, just like the tax admin-
istration targets their enforcement actions to different sub-populations depending on their
cost-effectiveness. We focus again on the payment reminder experiments, for which we were
able to obtain a large set of observables (including various demographics like age, family
composition, region, amount owed, taxable income and solvency estimated by the tax ad-
ministration). To discipline our analysis of treatment effect heterogeneity, we use the causal
forests algorithm created by Wager and Athey (2018).28
Figure 6 plots the dispersion of the treatment effects by treatment category (bin size is
set to 0.005 for all figures). While the figure only uncovers the heterogeneity in treatment
effects based on observables, it is interesting to compare the predicted heterogeneity across
treatments, using the same observables. Indeed, we see a wide dispersion for the simplifica-
tion treatment, but less so for the deterrence and tax morale ones. Moreover, perhaps not
surprisingly, the effect of the simplification treatment never turns negative. The deterrence
treatment, however, has negative effects for some tax payers. Interestingly, the tax morale
treatments seem to backfire across the population: almost all estimated treatment effects
are negative.
Using the same causal forests estimates, we can determine which observable characteris-
tics drive the heterogeneity in treatment effects. Figures A.6a to A.6h present the average
of the different observables in each treatment effect quintile. Figure A.6a suggests that sim-
plification is the least effective for on average older taxpayers and deterrence is the most
effective for on average younger taxpayers. Simplification seems to be very effective among
taxpayers with children, while the tax morale treatments seems to be more likely to backfire
for this group (Figure A.6c). Simplification seems also to be particularly ineffective for tax
payers with high predicted solvency, as predicted by the tax administration (Figure A.6f).
Deterrence, finally, seems to be particularly effective for taxpayers with lower outstanding
tax liability (Figure A.6h). There is no obvious pattern for gender (Figure A.6b), language
(Figure A.6d), region (Figure A.6e) or income (Figure A.6g).
The machine learning results thus identify four relevant dimensions of treatment hetero-
geneity: age, number of children, tax liability and solvency. We next estimate OLS regres-
sions of tax compliance on interactions of the treatment with these four main characteristics,
while including interactions of the treatment with all other characteristics as controls. Ta-
ble 6 presents the estimates. The corresponding estimates for the second TPR experiment,
27See for example Alcott et al. (2018) in the context of using corrective sin taxes.
28According to Chernozhukov et al. (2018), we are in the case where the Wager and Athey (2018)
method provides robust results: we have 10 dimensions of heterogeneity and about 230,000 observations
(log(230, 000) = 12 > 10).
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which was implemented in the fiscal year 2015 and was not used in the prediction algorithm,
are reported in Appendix Table A.12.
The first main dimension of heterogeneity detected by the causal forests is age. Once
we control for all observable characteristics and their interaction with treatment, we find
no differential treatment effect of simplification depending on taxpayers’ age. However, we
do find evidence of a significantly lower effect of both the deterrence and the tax morale
treatments for older workers. As compared to the younger group (30 and below), taxpayers
aged 40 and above have between 2 and 3 pp lower treatment effects. The fact that these
groups in the control have much higher compliance levels is likely part of the explanation as
there is a lower margin for improvement. But it could also be that nudge messages are less
effective with an older public.
The second main dimension of heterogeneity is the number of children. Households with
more children are significantly less compliant in the control, with a 2-3pp lower likelihood
of paying before 14 days than the control mean of 40%. The simplified letter, however,
increases the compliance by taxpayers with one child by an additional 1.9 pp (se 1.3) and
with two or more children by an additional 2.7 pp (se 1.4). Households with children are
hence less compliant on average, but reducing the information overload seems particularly
helpful for them.
The third important dimension of heterogeneity is outstanding tax liability. The com-
pliance effects of the simplified letter are about 4.2 to 6.2pp smaller for taxpayers with
outstanding debt above the lowest quintile. This decrease is replicated in 2016 and remains
when including all other controls interacted with the treatment variables. This evidence
indicates a trade-off in targeting taxpayers with higher outstanding tax liability. While the
returns to making them compliant are larger, their tax compliance is lower overall and so is
their responsiveness to the simplified letter treatment. The deterrence treatments also have
a significantly smaller and even negative effect on the higher quintiles of taxpayers in terms
of outstanding debt. However, this may also be driven by the fact that it is the average
penalty that is made explicit, rather than an individual-specific projection of the potential
penalty.
Finally, the fourth dimension of treatment heterogeneity is the solvency score. This
score is computed by the tax administration at the start of the tax collection cycle using a
prediction model and then used to decide on follow-up enforcement actions. The baseline
compliance rate ranges from 20.9 percent for the lowest quintile to 73.1 percent for the
highest quintile, confirming the strong predictive value of the solvency score in this context.
Interestingly, we find a non-monotone relation in the treatment effect. The simplification
treatment increases compliance the least in the lowest and the highest quintile and the most
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in the middle quintiles. The differences in treatment effects are substantial, with a maximum
difference in treatment effects of 6pp. These results highlight that simply targeting further
interventions based on baseline compliance may be undesirable.
6 Conclusion
By way of a series of population-wide experiments in Belgium, this research has shown that
simplifying communication by the tax administration consistently improves tax compliance.
Simplification makes taxpayers pay taxes on time and makes both late filers and late payers
comply more swiftly than they would otherwise. The positive effects of simplification are
universal across the population, they are sustained when simplification is repeated, and they
persist in the next fiscal years. Making it as easy as possible to comply therefore deserves
even greater attention since communication is an inherent part of any tax administration.
Our experimental design allows us to compare simplification with deterrence and tax morale
treatments in the same setting thereby simultaneously testing the three main factors of
tax compliance studied in the literature. The results also demonstrate the effectiveness of
deterrence messages. In contrast, invoking tax morale does not raise compliance and even
backfires for most taxpayers. Finally, we are able to causally estimate the costs and benefits
of nudge-type interventions as compared to traditional enforcement levers, and find nudge
treatments to be highly cost effective.
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Figure 2: Summary of the Main Results
(a) Tax Payment (b) Payment Reminder
(c) Tax Filing (d) Filing Reminder
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Note: The figure presents treatment effect estimates from baseline specifications for the TP (Panel (a)),
TPR FY2014 (Panel (b)), TF (Panel (c)) and TFR FY2015 (Panel (d)) experiments. The outcome is partial
payment probability at 60 days (deadline) in Panel (a), and at 14 days (enforcement) in Panel (b). The
outcome is reported taxable income in Panel (c) and filing probability at 21 days (enforcement) in Panel (d).
Control variables are listed in Table 1, for exact estimates refer to Table 2. 95% confidence intervals based
on robust standard errors are plotted. Standard errors are clustered by date of letter receipt in Panels (a)
and (b).
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Figure 3: Dynamic Effects of Simplification
(a) Tax Payment
(b) Payment Reminder
(c) Filing Reminder
Note: The figure presents simplification treatment effect estimates by days since letter receipt for the TP
(Panel (a)), TPR FY2014 (Panel (b)) and TFR FY2015 (Panel (c)) experiments. The outcome is partial
payment probability in Panels (a) and (b), and filing probability in Panel (c). The vertical lines indicate the
payment/filing deadline and/or the day enforcement actions start. Control variables are listed in Table 1.
95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors plotted. Standard errors are clustered by date of
letter receipt in Panels (a) and (b).
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Figure 4: Effects of Enforcement and Simplification
(a) Probability of Enforcement after 180 Days
(b) Probability of Partial Payment after 180 Days
Note: The figure is based on the TPR FY2014 experiment. It shows probability of enforcement after 180 days
(Panel (a)) and probability of partial payment after 180 days (Panel (b)) by initial amount owed (centred
at the enforcement threshold). Bin size is set to e5 and amounts within e100 of the enforcement threshold
are considered. Fractional polynomial predictions plotted.
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Figure 5: Tax Filing: Treatment Effect on Survey Responses
Note: The figure presents treatment effect estimates from the analysis of survey responses in the TF exper-
iment. Outcomes are standardized using mean and standard deviation of control group responses. Control
variables are dummies for gender and age categories. 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard
errors are plotted.
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Figure 6: Distribution of treatment effects
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Note: The figure presents the distribution of estimated treatment effects in the TPR FY2014 experiment.
It uses the generalized random forest (GRF) algorithm (Wager and Athey, 2018) as described in the text.
Figures (a)-(c) differ in the definition of treatment and control groups. In Figure (a) the control is composed
of taxpayers who received the old letter and the treatment of taxpayers who received a simplified letter
without any additional message. In Figure (b) and (c) taxpayers who received a simplified letter without
any additional message are the control group. In Figure (b) the treatment is composed of taxpayers who
received a simplified letter with a deterrence message. In Figure (c) the treatment is composed of taxpayers
who received a simplified letter with an added tax morale message.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Control Variables
Experiment: All taxpayers Tax Payment Tax Filing
Payment Reminder Filing Reminder
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Demographics
Male dummy 0.309 0.324 0.448 0.276 0.529
(0.462) (0.468) (0.497) (0.447) (0.499)
Couple dummy 0.346 0.415 0.298 0.445 0.132
(0.476) (0.493) (0.457) (0.497) (0.339)
Age 49.495 53.354 47.764 47.596 42.229
(18.129) (16.382) (15.611) (15.585) (16.249)
Number of children 0.413 0.351 0.409 0.579 0.334
(0.869) (0.771) (0.830) (0.950) (0.836)
Married dummy 0.476
(0.499)
Widowed dummy 0.040
(0.196)
Divorced dummy 0.156
(0.363)
Region / Language
Wallonia dummy 0.327 0.316 0.367 0.284 0.390
(0.469) (0.465) (0.482) (0.451) (0.488)
Flanders dummy 0.570 0.596 0.525 0.637 0.390
(0.495) (0.491) (0.499) (0.481) (0.488)
French dummy 0.421 0.386 0.473 0.357 0.592
(0.494) (0.487) (0.499) (0.479) (0.491)
German dummy 0.006 0.011 - 0.003 0.007
(0.076) (0.104) (0.051) (0.084)
Other
Amount owed 568.635 2676.205 1890.950
(7301.068) (11869.230) (4746.221)
Income 33211.010
(28804.210)
Solvency score 11.657
(4.674)
N 6,689,779 1,216,317 229,751 942,571 148,925
Note: The table presents means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of control variables for different
samples. In column 1 the sample is composed of all individual income taxpayers in FY2016. In column 2 it
is the sample of the TP FY2016 experiment. In column 3 it is the sample of the TPR FY2014 experiment.
In column 4 it is the sample of the TF FY2016 experiment. In column 5 it is the sample of the TFR FY2015
experiment. The base category for gender is female, for region Brussels, for language Flemish and for marital
status single.
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Table 2: Main Results
Panel A: Payment Probability of some payment
at 60 days (deadline) at 14 days (before enforcement)
Tax Payment Payment Reminders
(1) (2)
Simplified 0.00507*** 0.102***
(0.00146) (0.0103)
+ Deterrence 0.00533*** 0.0124***
(0.00110) (0.00303)
+ Tax Morale -0.00116 -0.00742**
(0.000899) (0.00259)
P-value (Det=TM) 0.000 0.000
Control mean 0.728 0.447
N 1,216,317 229,751
Panel B: Filing Log pre-check Probability of having filed
taxable income at 21 days (before enforcement)
Tax Filing Filing Reminders
(1) (2)
Simplified 0.0258***
(0.00516)
+ Deterrence 0.0279***
(0.00385)
Tax Morale -0.00110
(0.00135)
Control mean 15.04 0.317
N 942,571 148,925
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates from baseline specifications in four separate experiments.
Column 1 in Panel A presents the results of the TP experiment (taxpayers for the FY2016). Column 2 in
Panel A presents the results of the TPR 2014 experiment (late taxpayers in the FY2014). Column 1 in Panel
B presents the results of the TF experiment (online tax filers in the FY2016). Column 2 in Panel B presents
the results of the TFR experiment (late tax filers in the FY2015). Control variables are listed in Table 1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by date of letter receipt in Panel A. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05;
*** p<0.01.
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Table 3: Replication, Long-term and Repeated Treatment Effects
Panel A: Long-term Effects Probability of being on time Probability of being on time
with payment FY+1 year with payment FY+2 years
(1) (2)
Simplified 0.0114*** 0.00554
(0.00276) (0.00378)
+ Deterrence -0.000929 -0.00378
(0.00250) (0.00214)
+ Tax Morale -0.00728*** -0.00606**
(0.00229) (0.00238)
P-value (Det=TM) 0.001 0.261
Control mean 0.689 0.769
N 229,751 229,751
Panel B: Replication FY2015 Probability of some payment
at 14 days (before enforcement)
Simplified 0.104***
(0.00479)
+ Deterrence 0.0160***
(0.00294)
+ Tax Morale -0.0113***
(0.00290)
+ Deterrence & Tax Morale 0.00685*
(0.00327)
P-value (Det=TM) 0.000
P-value (Det=Det+TM) 0.003
Control mean 0.419
N 188,180
Panel C: Repeated Treatment Probability of some payment
at 14 days (before enforcement)
Simplified 2014 -0.00402
(0.0117)
Simplified 2015 0.0966***
(0.0122)
Simplified 2014 * Simplified 2015 0.000960
(0.0121)
Control mean 0.423
N 64,736
Note: The table presents results from the replication, long-term and repeated treatment analysis. The
sample in Panel A is the universe of late payers in FY2015. In Panel B it is the universe of late payers in
FY2014. In Panel C it is composed of taxpayers who were late with payment in both FY2014 and FY2015.
Control variables are listed in Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt.
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 5: RDD: Effect of Payment Reminders Simplification and Enforcement FY2014
Probability of enforcement Probability of some payment
within 180 days at 14 days (before enforcement) within 180 days
(1) (2) (3)
Simplified -0.0829*** 0.151*** 0.0442**
(0.0217) (0.0249) (0.0194)
Enforcement 0.130*** 0.00626 0.0615**
(0.0296) (0.0340) (0.0265)
Simplified*Enforcement -0.0482 0.000312 -0.0273
(0.0316) (0.0363) (0.0283)
Control Mean 0.200 0.489 0.813
N 20,793 23,312 21,894
Note: The table presents regression discontinuity design estimates. Simplified is a dummy variable equal to
one for taxpayers who received a simplified letter. Enforcement is a dummy variable equal to one for liability
amounts above the cut-off value. Control variables are listed in Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by date of letter receipt. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects – Payment Reminder Experiment FY2014
Probability of payment at 14 days (before enforcement)
Variable Variable
(1) (2)
Simplified 0.112*** Solvency score Q2 * Simplified 0.0586***
(0.0139) (0.0105)
+ Deterrence 0.0529*** * Deterrence -0.00793
(0.00908) (0.00710)
+ Social 0.0136 * Social -0.0126**
(0.0177) (0.00536)
Age 31-40 * Simplified 0.0123 Solvency score Q3 * Simplified 0.0564***
(0.0128) (0.0142)
* Deterrence -0.0105 * Deterrence -0.00357
(0.0118) (0.00775)
* Social -0.00637 * Social -0.00428
(0.0103) (0.0105)
Age 41-50 * Simplified 0.0246 Solvency score Q4 * Simplified 0.0239
(0.0139) (0.0155)
* Deterrence -0.0260** * Deterrence -0.0162
(0.0117) (0.0132)
* Social -0.0258** * Social -0.00116
(0.0115) (0.0147)
Age 51-60 * Simplified 0.0113 Solvency score Q5 * Simplified -0.0303
(0.0131) (0.0208)
* Deterrence -0.0284** * Deterrence -0.00214
(0.0102) (0.0110)
* Social -0.0280** * Social 0.0115
(0.00993) (0.0115)
Age 61+ * Simplified -0.0167
(0.0128) Liability Q2 * Simplified -0.0495***
* Deterrence -0.0245* (0.0118)
(0.0131) * Deterrence -0.00485
* Social -0.0165* (0.0102)
(0.00818) * Social 0.0174
(0.0109)
One child * Simplified 0.0191 Liability Q3 * Simplified -0.0423***
(0.0128) (0.0102)
* Deterrence 0.00770 * Deterrence -0.0185**
(0.0104) (0.00722)
* Social 0.0133 * Social 0.00357
(0.0118) (0.00730)
Two or more children * Simplified 0.0269* Liability Q4 * Simplified -0.0622***
(0.0141) (0.0102)
* Deterrence -0.0110 * Deterrence -0.0161
(0.0116) (0.00962)
* Social -0.0116 * Social 0.0163
(0.0106) (0.00990)
Liability Q5 * Simplified -0.0456***
(0.0112)
* Deterrence -0.0410***
(0.00783)
* Social 0.00652
(0.00989)
Control mean 0.400
N 229,751
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates from the heterogeneous effects analysis. Control vari-
ables are listed in Table 1. The full set of interactions between individual control and treatment variables
are included in the estimation (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
date of letter receipt. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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ONLINE APPENDIX
A.1 Filing Reminder Experiment 2014
For the fiscal year 2014, the administration independently carried out an experiment on filing
reminders. 162,682 late filers were part of the experiment. Unlike the other experiments we
study in the paper, the treatment group did not receive a simplified letter. Instead, they
received tax morale messages included in the usual (complex) letter. The messages were as
follows:
 Public Goods: “By filing and paying your taxes you guarantee the provision of essential
services of the government, such as education, public health and public safety”
 Social Norm: “You belong to a minority because 94% of Belgian taxpayers filed on
time. Why not follow their example?”
 Public Goods+Social Norm: “You belong to a minority because 94% of Belgian tax-
payers filed on time. Why not follow their example? By filing and paying your taxes
you guarantee the provision of essential services of the government, such as education,
public health and public safety”
For this experiment, the main outcome is the probability of filing 21 days after letter receipt:
21 days is the time at which the tax administration uses its own estimate to calculate the
tax liability.
Appendix Table A.8 presents the results of the experiment. We find no evidence that
public goods messages, social norm messages, or the combination of the two increase the
probability of filing on time. This is consistent with the results from the other experiments
studied in this paper, which suggest that tax morale messages are not effective in raising tax
compliance. However, in this case the complexity of the letter may have made the messages
less salient.
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A.2 Tax-on-web Survey
The answers to the following 10 questions are treated independently on an anonymous basis
and are not linked to individual declarations.
1. On a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent do you find it easy to submit your tax return via
Tax-on-Web?
2. On a scale of 1 to 10, how satisfied are you with the content and functions of Tax-On-
Web?
3. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you recommend Tax-On-Web to friend (s) or colleague
(s)?
4. On a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent are you satisfied with the general tax system?
5. On a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent do you value the public services where (your) tax
money is used for?
6. On a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent do you agree with the way your tax money is
currently being spent?
7. On a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent do you think citizens should be completely honest
when completing their tax return?
8. On a scale of 1 to 10, to what extent do you have a good idea of where your tax money
goes?
9. Please add the following budget categories with the percentage of tax payable to you
to these public services (total = 100%):
 General government management (public debt, public services, basic research,
foreign economic assistance, etc.)
 Defence
 Public order and safety
 Economics
 Environmental protection
 Housing and common facilities
 Recreation, culture and religion
46
 Education
 Health
 Social protection (elderly, sickness and disability, family and children, unemploy-
ment, ...)
10. If you had the opportunity to give your preference in terms of budget priorities, in
which order would you spend the following categories on your tax money? Please
place numbers from 1 (highest priority) to 10 (lowest priority) next to the following
categories: (same as above)
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Figure A.1: Tax morale treatment in filing process
48
Figure A.2: Dynamics of Tax Compliance in the Control Group
(a) Tax Payment
(b) Payment Reminder
(c) Filing Reminder
Note: The figure presents average compliance in the control group by days since letter receipt for the
TP (Panel (a)), TPR FY2014 (Panel (b)) and TFR FY2015 (Panel (c)) experiments. Outcome is partial
payment probability at 60 days / deadline in Figure (a) and at 14 days / enforcement start in Figure (b);
outcome is filing probability at 21 days / enforcement start in Figure (c).
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Figure A.3: Dynamic Effects of Deterrence and Tax Morale Messages
(a) Tax Payment
(b) Payment Reminder
(c) Filing Reminder
Note: The figure presents deterrence and tax morale treatment effect estimates by days since letter receipt
for the TP (Panel (a)), TPR FY2014 (Panel (b)) and TFR FY2015 (Panel (c)) experiments. The outcome
is partial payment probability in Panels (a) and (b), and filing probability in Panel (c). The vertical lines
indicate the payment/filing deadline and/or the day follow-up enforcement starts. Controls are listed in
Table 1. 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors are plotted. Standard errors are clustered
by date of letter receipt in Panels (a) and (b).
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Figure A.4: RDD – Identifying Assumptions
(a) Density around the threshold - Control
(b) Density around the threshold - Treatment
(c) Probability of Paying before Enforcement
Note: The figure is based on the TPR FY2014 experiment. It explores the plausibility of the identification
assumptions underlying the RDD. Panels (a) and (b) plot the average density by bin in the control and
treatment group, respectively. Panel (c) plots the probability of payment before enforcement by initial
amount owed (centred at the enforcement threshold). Bin size is set to e5 and amounts within e100 of the
enforcement threshold are considered. Fractional polynomial predictions are plotted as well.
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Figure A.5: Effects of Enforcement
(a) Probability of Enforcement at 180 days
(b) Probability of Partial Payment at 14 days /
enforcement start
(c) Probability of Partial Payment at 180 days
Note: The figure is based on the the TPR FY2014 experiment. It shows probability of enforcement after
180 days (Panel (a)), probability of paying after 14 days (Panel (b)) and probability of paying after 180
days (Panel (c)) by initial amount owed (centred at the enforcement threshold). Bin size is set to e5 and
amounts within e100 of the enforcement threshold are considered. Fractional polynomial predictions with
95% confidence intervals plotted. 52
Figure A.6: Average Value of Control Variables by Quintile of Treatment Effects
Simplification Deterrence Tax Morale
(a) Average Age
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Simplification Deterrence Tax Morale
(e) Average of Region Categories
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Note: The figure presents the mean and 95% confidence interval of control variables from TPR FY2014
experiment by quintile of conditional average treatment effect (CATE). These were estimated using the
generalized random forest (GRF) algorithm (Wager and Athey, 2018). Three panels in each figure differ in
the definition of treatment and control groups. The underlying sample of taxpayers are those in the control
group and those sent a simplified letter without additional messages in the left panel, simplified letter and
a simplified letter with a deterrence message in the middle panel, a simplified letter and a simplified letter
with a tax morale message in right panel. 54
Table A.1: Letter Messages by Experiment
Experiment / Type Name Message
Panel A: Tax Payment
Simplification Not personalized Madam, Sir (instead of taxpayer names)
Deterrence Explicit Penalty These costs amount to 209 euros on average and can go up
depending on the circumstances.
Enforcement + Immediacy Warning: do not wait until the deadline to pay, you run the
risk of being late. If you do not pay on time, we will start
actions to recover this amount.
Tax Morale Social Norm In Belgium 95% of taxes are paid on time.
Public Goods Tax revenues allow basic public services such as health care,
education and law and order, to function.
Panel B: Payment Reminders
Deterrence Explicit Penalty These costs amount to 209.00 euro on average and may, depending on
(FY2014, 2015) the situation, rise further.
Active Choice Not paying your taxes will be seen as an active choice.
(FY2014)
Explicit Penalty + Immediacy These costs amount to 209.00 euro on average and may, depending on
(FY2015) the situation, rise further. By paying now you may still avoid these
costs.
Explicit Penalty + Enforcement These costs amount to 209.00 euro on average and may, depending on
(FY2015) the situation, rise further. We will undertake actions to claim tax dues
that may involve seizing your income or your assets.
Explicit Penalty FM Woman’s name, Man’s name (instead of reversed)
(FY2015)
Tax Morale Social Norm You belong to a minority of taxpayers who did not pay their
(FY2014, 2015) taxes within the legal period: 95% of taxes in Belgium are
paid on time. Why not follow this example?
Public Goods Paying taxes guarantees the provision of essential services by
(FY2014) the government, such as public health, education, and public
safety.
Public Goods Negative Not paying taxes puts at risk the provision of essential
(FY2014, 2015) services by the government, such as public health, education,
and public safety.
Panel C: Tax Filing
Tax Morale Public Goods The above pie chart illustrates how your taxes and social security
contributions are spent in terms of public services.
Public Goods Negative The above pie chart illustrates how your taxes and social security
contributions are spent in terms of public services. Incorrect and timely
completion of the declaration puts at risk the essential services provided
by the government.
Public Goods + Penalty The above pie chart illustrates how your taxes and social security
contributions are spent in terms of public services. By completing your
declaration correctly and in a timely fashion, you avoid further measures
such as fines and tax increases.
Public Goods + Social Norms The above pie chart illustrates how your taxes and social security
contributions are spent in terms of public services. The vast majority
of people complete their declaration correctly and in a timely manner.
Please follow this example.
Panel D: Filing Reminders
Deterrence Explicit Penalty You risk a penalty of 50 to 1,250 euro and a tax increase of 10
(FY2015) to 200%.
Tax Morale Social Norm You belong to a minority as 94% of Belgians file their tax
(FY2014) declarations on time. Why not follow this example?
Public Goods Paying taxes guarantees the provision of essential services by
(FY2014) the government, such as public health, education, and public
safety.
Note: The table lists all letter messages by experiment and treatment type.
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Table A.4: Overlap across experiments
Share of taxpayers in experiment
Payment Reminders Payment Reminders Filing Reminders
FY2014 FY2015 FY2015
Experiment (1) (2) (3)
Payment Reminders FY2014 1.000 0.283 0.062
Payment Reminders FY2015 0.307 1.000 0.066
Filing Reminders FY2015 0.106 0.104 1.000
Note: The table presents the overlap between populations of taxpayers in the payment reminders (TPR)
and filing reminders experiments (TFR). Each cell gives the share of taxpayers in the experiment listed
horizontally that were also part of the population of the experiment listed vertically.
Table A.5: Repeated Treatment Effects
Probability of some payment
14 days (before enforcement)
(1)
Simplified 2014 -0.00813
(0.0138)
Simplified 2015 0.0987***
(0.0117)
Simplified 2014 * Simplified 2015 0.00136
(0.0124)
+ Deterrence 2014 0.00817
(0.00557)
+ Deterrence 2015 0.00827
(0.00527)
+ Deterrence 2014 * + Deterrence 2015 -0.00365
(0.00720)
+ Tax Morale 2014 0.00214
(0.00729)
+ Tax Morale 2015 -0.0171***
(0.00272)
+ Tax Morale 2014 * + Tax Morale 2015 0.00145
(0.00699)
Control mean 0.423
N 64,736
Note: The table present treatment effect estimates for repeated treatment in the payment reminders exper-
iment. Sample size is limited to individuals who were late with payment in both FY2014 and FY2015. For
FY2015 treatment assignment both dummies for Deterrence and Tax Morale equal one for individuals who
received a letter with both a deterrence and tax morale message. Control variables are listed in Table 1.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table A.6: Payment Experiments: Individual Letter Effects
Probability of some payment
14 days (before enforcement) before the deadline
TPR FY2014 TPR FY2015 TP
(1) (2) (3)
Simplification Treatments
Simplified 0.102*** 0.104*** 0.00464**
(0.0103) (0.00479) (0.00162)
+ Not personalized 0.000841
(0.00125)
Deterrence Treatments
+ Explicit Penalty 0.0204*** 0.0104** 0.00440***
(0.00250) (0.00387) (0.000893)
+ Active Choice 0.000774
(0.00364)
+ Explicit Penalty+Active Choice 0.0160**
(0.00549)
+ Explicit Penalty+Enforcement 0.0252***
(0.00280)
+ Explicit Penalty+Immediacy 0.0187***
(0.00407)
+ Explicit Penalty FM 0.00971*
(0.00479)
+ Explicit Enforcement + Immediacy 0.00711***
(0.00124)
Tax Morale Treatments
+ Public Goods Negative -0.00741* -0.0126***
(0.00366) (0.00262)
+ Public Goods Positive -0.0142*** -0.00232
(0.00378) (0.00135)
+ Social Norms -0.00232 -0.01000** 0.000841
(0.00377) (0.00404) (0.00125)
+ Social Norms+Public Goods Positive -0.00646
(0.00432)
Deterrence & Tax Morale Treatments
+ Explicit Penalty+Social Norm 0.00769**
(0.00311)
+ Explicit Penalty+Public Goods Negative 0.00601
(0.00448)
Control mean 0.447 0.419 0.728
N 229,751 188,180 1,216,317
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates of messages in the two payment reminder experiments
(TPR 2014 in column 1 and TPR 2015 in column 2) and in the tax payment (TP) experiment (column 3).
Control variables are listed in Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt.
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table A.7: Treatment Effects on Other Outcomes
Panel A: Tax Payment TPR 2014 TPR 2015 TP
% Liability Paid % Liability Paid % Liability Paid
before Enforcement before Enforcement before Deadline
(1) (2) (3)
Simplified 0.00307 0.00995** 0.00162**
(0.00183) (0.00404) (0.000599)
+ Deterrence 0.00210 0.00227 -0.000238
(0.00149) (0.00185) (0.000507)
+ Tax Morale 0.000384 -0.000729 -0.000447
(0.00156) (0.00224) (0.000547)
+ Deterrence & Tax 0.00327
Morale (0.00218)
Control mean 0.915 0.900 0.941
N 124,032 98,422 892,310
Panel B: Tax Filing Log pre-check total Log self-employed Log self-employed
tax due profits expenses
(1) (2) (3)
Tax Morale -0.00265 0.000692 0.000189
(0.00257) (0.00789) (0.00774)
Control mean 13.45 12.77 12.94
N 850,778 51,183 36,260
Panel B (continued) Log salaried Log general
expenses expenses
(4) (5)
Tax Morale -0.00404 -0.00526
(0.00335) (0.00372)
Control mean 13.15 11.08
N 33,103 233,889
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates for other outcomes of interest in the tax payment (TP
FY2016 Panel A) and the tax filing (TF FY2016 Panel B) experiments. In Panel A the sample consists of
late payers who had made some payment before enforcement started. Control variables are listed in Table 1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by date of letter receipt in Panel A. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05;
*** p<0.01.
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Table A.8: Filing Reminders FY2014
Probability of having filed
21 days (before enforcement)
(1)
Public Goods -0.00502**
(0.00243)
Social Norms 0.000550
(0.00244)
PG+SN -0.00263
(0.00244)
Control mean 0.147
N 162,682
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates
from the filing reminders experiment (TFR FY2014).
Control variables are listed in Table 1. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***
p<0.01.
Table A.9: Payment Reminders FY2014
Probability of some payment
2 days 14 days 30 days 180 days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Simplified 0.0645*** 0.103*** 0.0688*** 0.00954**
(0.0114) (0.0102) (0.00425) (0.00345)
Control mean 0.166 0.447 0.598 0.845
N 229,751 229,751 229,751 229,751
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates from the payment reminders experiment (TPR FY2014).
Control variables are listed in Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt.
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table A.10: Number of Follow-up Enforcements FY2014
Nr registered letters Nr garnishments Nr bailiffs
within 180 days within 180 days within 180 days
(1) (2) (3)
Simplified -0.0740*** -0.0278*** -0.0118***
(0.00272) (0.00206) (0.00157)
Control mean 0.350 0.134 0.078
N 229,751 229,751 229,751
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates on the number of enforcement actions by type from the
payment reminders experiment (TPR FY2014). Control variables are listed in Table 1. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Table A.11: RDD: Number of Follow-up Enforcements FY2014
Nr registered letters Nr garnishments Nr bailiffs
within 180 days within 180 days within 180 days
(1) (2) (3)
Simplified -0.0670*** -0.0235* 0.00223
(0.0173) (0.0135) (0.00329)
Enforcement 0.102*** 0.0592*** -0.000523
(0.0236) (0.0184) (0.00447)
Simplified*Enforcement -0.0506** -0.0162 0.000178
(0.0252) (0.0197) (0.00477)
Control mean 0.154 0.056 0.002
N 28,665 25,246 29,409
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates from the regression discontinuity design analysis em-
bedded in the payment reminder experiment (TPR FY2014). Simplified is a dummy variable equal to one
for taxpayers who received a simplified letter. Enforcement is a dummy variable equal to one for liability
amounts above the cut-off value. Control variables are listed in Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by date of letter receipt. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table A.12: Heterogeneous Effects – Payment Reminders Experiment FY2015
Probability of payment at 14 days (before enforcement)
Variable Variable
(1) (2)
Simplified 0.0939*** Solvency score Q2 * Simplified 0.0502*
(0.0274) (0.0265)
+ Deterrence 0.0220 * Deterrence 0.00372
(0.0232) (0.0178)
+ Social -0.0283 * Social 0.00544
(0.0207) (0.0151)
Age 31-40 * Simplified 0.00507 Solvency score Q3 * Simplified 0.0862***
(0.0132) (0.0263)
* Deterrence -0.00330 * Deterrence -0.0285*
(0.0147) (0.0155)
* Social -0.0109 * Social -0.0302*
(0.0113) (0.0150)
Age 41-50 * Simplified -0.0188* Solvency score Q4 * Simplified 0.0399*
(0.0106) (0.0211)
* Deterrence -0.00424 * Deterrence -0.00731
(0.00923) (0.0127)
* Social -0.00785 * Social -0.00416
(0.0139) (0.0153)
Age 51-60 * Simplified -0.0192 Solvency score Q5 * Simplified 0.0282
(0.0180) (0.0168)
* Deterrence 0.000563 * Deterrence -0.00214
(0.0146) (0.0143)
* Social -0.00704 * Social 0.0126
(0.0166) (0.0134)
Age 61+ * Simplified -0.0326**
(0.0134) Liability Q2 * Simplified -0.0327**
* Deterrence -0.00480 (0.0140)
(0.0144) * Deterrence -0.00550
* Social -0.00792 (0.0116)
(0.0127) * Social 0.0256*
(0.0129)
One child * Simplified 0.0143 Liability Q3 * Simplified -0.0158
(0.0118) (0.0163)
* Deterrence 0.00540 * Deterrence -0.00686
(0.0129) (0.00745)
* Social 0.0195 * Social 0.0102
(0.0158) (0.00675)
Two or more children * Simplified 0.0379** Liability Q4 * Simplified -0.0518**
(0.0168) (0.0218)
* Deterrence -0.0136 * Deterrence -0.0136
(0.0124) (0.00986)
* Social -0.0169 * Social 0.0202**
(0.0103) (0.00829)
Liability Q5 * Simplified -0.0540**
(0.0200)
* Deterrence -0.0223**
(0.00931)
* Social 0.0205
(0.0119)
Control mean 0.333
N 188,180
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates from the heterogeneous effects analysis of the second
payment reminder experiment (TPR FY2015). Control variables are listed in Table 1. The full set of
interactions between individual control and treatment variables are included in the estimation (coefficients
not reported). Estimates for Deterrence and Tax Morale joint treatment omitted for brevity. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered by date of letter receipt. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table A.13: Filing Reminders FY2015
Probability of having filed
21 days (before enforcement)
(1)
Simplified 0.0191*
(0.0105)
+ Deterrence 0.0284***
(0.0102)
Control mean 0.317
N 148,925
Note: The table presents treatment effect estimates
from filing reminders experiment (TFR FY2015).
Control variables are listed in Table 1. Additional con-
trols include dummies for the treatment the taxpayer
would have received if had been late with payment
in the previous fiscal year. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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